China's property market has been the subject of much media coverage in recent years. Rapid price increases for residential property and the possibility of a price bubble in many cities has led the central government to take a myriad of regulatory measures to cool housing markets. Scholarly attention has focused either on inter-city analyses or case studies of the high-GDP coastal cities like Shanghai and Beijing, and too little is known about the property market dynamics of more typical Chinese cities. Moreover, there is a dearth of research on the role of State Owned Enterprises (SOE), which play an important role in China's housing boom. This paper uses a comprehensive set of georeferenced housing transactions, joined with remote sensing data and data on neighborhood amenities and transportation infrastructure, to analyze the dynamics of the Chengdu housing market from 2004 to 2011 and assess the differences between housing produced by SOE and other types of developers. The observed reduction in variation in housing prices and sizes, as well as a growing premium for larger units can be plausibly connected to new government regulations. We find that units developed by SOE sell at a discount.
Introduction
China's spectacular pace of urban growth during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s has been tightly controlled by government planners, yet since major housing market reforms in the late 1990s; housing development has been mostly undertaken by private companies. Nevertheless, as property prices grew from the mid-2000s, a series of increasingly stringent and unorthodox regulations were implemented by central and local governments to re-exert control. Although there is a growing understanding of China's nascent property market, much of the research is either inter-urban or focused on the large coastal cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. This paper examines the property market of Chengdu, which is a useful case study because it is an average city in many respects; property price dynamics have mirrored trends across China. Yet it is also expected to grow rapidly in the future; in 2006 China Daily named Chengdu as the fourth most livable city in the country (Fu, 2006) .
Depending on the methodology used to calculate the price index, residential property prices in Chengdu are estimated to have increased by between six and nine percent annually between 2006 and 2010. Yet urban economists have increasingly recognized that average prices can mask important variation within cities and have begun to more rigorously examine changes in the distribution of prices both and across space (McMillen, 2008; Deng et al., 2012; Monkkonen et al., 2012 ). Chengdu's property market during the recent boom period provides a greater understanding of the evolution of an emerging housing market system as well as the importance of strict regulations the Chinese government has imposed to control the housing market. This is important not only for academic understanding of housing markets, but also has implications for housing affordability and the question of a bubble, at least in the context of Chengdu.
The focus of this paper is the dynamics of Chengdu's property market during the boom period and specifically the presence of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). To do this, we first analyze how the distribution of housing prices and unit sizes has changed over the time period in question. We then analyze the characteristics of housing produced during this time period and their market valuation using a hedonic regression model. Finally, we assess the price difference of otherwise similar housing built by different types of companies, responding to the question of whether projects built by SOEs differ as dramatically in Chengdu as they have been reported to in Beijing .
In order to answer these questions, we model the way in which the influence of different housing price determinants has changed; not only unit characteristics but also location and some neighborhood attributes. To do this, several data sources are employed, starting with transaction data provided by the government. This dataset, similar to that used by Zheng and Kahn (2008) in their analysis of the Beijing property market for one year, covers almost all property transactions in Chengdu from 2004 to 2011; roughly 600,000 sales in about 1,400 residential projects. We create a number of neighborhood indicators based on the location of projects by spatially matching the transactions to census data from the year 2000, data on the transportation network, indicators of urban growth estimated based on remote sensing data, and the proximity of publicly provided amenities such as post offices and schools .
The paper is structured as follows. The first section after this introduction is an overview of the reforms that have led to China's housing market as it exists today, with a brief discussion of how market-based the housing system in China is as well as some research on bubbles in China's property markets. Then we introduce the instrumental case study city, Chengdu, along with the datasets that are used to analyze the intra-urban dynamics of the housing boom. The fourth section presents the results of analysis of the spatial dynamics of housing prices in Chengdu, and the paper concludes with a discussion of implications for further research.
Creating a housing market in the People's Republic of China (PRC)
From the foundation of PRC to the early 1990s, the main sources of housing were formerly private housing units or national welfare housing distributed through the danwei or work unit system. After China's opening in 1978, work-based welfare housing began to impose a significant financial burden to government and business and the housing system began to gradually be reformed. In August 1990, promulgated by the State Council, the Urban StateOwned Land Use, Sale and Transfer Provisional Regulation came into force. This enabled stateowned land to be mortgaged, leased, transferred and sold, effectively creating a private market for land and housing (Zhu, 1999) .
Until 1998, however, housing allocation continued to operate through employment; government or state-owned enterprises bought or built housing and then they assigned units to their employees for some small fee (Chen, 1996) . This in-kind housing subsidy policy was officially abolished in 1998 and the State Council introduced the State Council Circular on Further Deepening the Reform of Urban Housing System and Speeding up Housing Construction, which is generally regarded as the milestone of the marketization of the Chinese real estate sector (Deng et al., 2011) . The development of the Chinese real estate market can be divided into four phases, which we refer to as gradual reform (1978-1997), commercialization (1998-2003), boom (2004-2008) and regulation (2009-2011) .
Phase I: Gradual reform, 1978 Gradual reform, -1997 At the beginning of China's opening in 1978, Deng Xiaoping introduced the issue of housing reform, though reforms until the late 1990s were very gradual. In June 1979, the National Infrastructure Construction Work Meeting Report Outline was officially endorsed by the Central Committee of CPC and the State Council, which began increasing rents. A policy of "full-price housing", under which tenants were charged something approximating a market value was implemented in about 160 cities and 300 counties from 1982 to 1985, but was unsuccessful at stimulating the private production of housing. Further reforms in the mid-1990s that created a housing provident fund and promoted rent increases and privatization were also unsuccessful and most housing continued to be produced and allocated by work-units or the government (Huang, 2004) . During the gradual reform period, housing prices in China did not increase rapidly, other than a real estate bubble in Hainan Province in the early 1990s. However, this bubble burst after aggressive central government intervention, resulting in a major collapse of financial corporations, for example, the Hainan Development Bank, and it was a large drag on Hainan's economy (Yu, 2010 (Liu et al., 2012) .
Phase III: Boom, 2004 By 2004 it was clear that a private real estate industry had been successfully stimulated in China, but significant and rapid increases in property prices were seen, especially in the major coastal cities. In response, the Central Government began to introduce regulations in order to cool the real estate market. In spite of policy efforts, property prices continued to rise in 2006, especially in major coastal cities. In respond to the continued increase, new policies were more frequently introduced though to no avail. According to a survey by the National Bureau of Statistics, prices increased by 5 percent on year-over-year basis in the 70 big-and-medium-sized cities in China in December 2006. Thus, in the middle of 2006 (24 th in May, 2006), a supply-side policy, Adjustment the Housing supply Structures and stable the housing prices, was introduced that specified that more than 70 percent of every city's new housing unit area must be comprised of units smaller than 90 square meters. This policy would prove to have a strong impact, at least in Chegndu.
Attempts to control the property boom through financing continued in 2007, with the Notice on Reinforcing the Credit Management of Commercial Real Estate, which increased down payment requirements and lending rates, and the reserve requirement for banks was raised ten times, from 9 to almost 15 percent. Just as these began to show their effectiveness, the global financial crisis hit. After May 2008, real estate policy took a sharp turn from restriction to support; down payment requirements were eased and there were a 30 percent discount on mortgage rates. Most local governments also introduced unconventional measures such as property deed tax refunds and property income tax refund in order to stimulate the market. , which limited families from purchasing more than two housing units. However, as prices continued to rise rapidly in 2010, further action was taken. In January 2011, the Premier of the State Council Wen Jiabao, issued the Updated State Council's Eight Regulations, which penalized local governments that did not implement regulations such as increased transaction tax and down payments of 60 percent for second homes. Further efforts to cool the market included three increases in deposit and loan rates during 2011, an increase in the housing provident fund mortgage interest rate, an increase of the reserve requirement to 21 percent. These measures seem to have limited speculation in real estate, increased the cost of purchasing property, and reduced liquidity in the market, leading many developers to begin cutting prices in the end of 2011 (McMillan, 2011) .
Is there a housing bubble? Is there a housing market?
Much debate over China's housing market has focused in part on identifying the reasons for the steep increase in property prices and analyzing whether this price appreciation is a real estate bubble. Researchers in China have proposed several causes for the run up in housing prices, including speculation, the appreciation of the Yuan, demographic shifts, and foreign investment in luxury property (Jiang, 2005; Du and Liu, 2007; Liu, 2008; Xu et al., 2012) . Yet even diagnosing a bubble in a property market that has only existed for about two decades -the first land auctions were in Shenzhen and Shanghai in 1987 and 1988 (Zhu, 1999 -is a challenge, especially since the two decades in question have seen such rapid economic and urban growth. Analysis of price-rent ratios using the user cost of capital model does suggest that expectations about growth in the large markets are higher than observed growth during the past two decades but that income growth has outpaced that of housing prices in many markets, including Chengdu.
There is strong evidence that a housing market equilibrium has been established since privatization began in the mid-1990s (Wang, 2011) , and data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China shows that in 2007, the majority of urban housing units are commercial housing or privatized public housing at 32 and 34 percent of stock respectively (Man, 2011) . In Chengdu, at least according to official statistics, only about seven percent of the population still resided in collective housing in the year 2000 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2000).
Nonetheless, some scholars argue that in fact, preferential treatment by the State still accounts for a great deal of the variation in people's housing quality and a true market has not yet been established (Logan et al., 2009) . The idea that the housing market in China is highly distorted is common, as one of its salient features is high levels of investment in second homes for many middle-and upper-income households, due in part to the lack of other investment vehicles. More than six percent of Chinese households were found to own two or more houses according to a 2005 survey, also which rise to thirteen percent in 2010 (China Household Finance Survey, 2010) , and an additional five percent were found to rent their primary home but own a second home for investment purposes (Huang and Yi, 2009 ). The question of overinvestment in housing and high vacancy rates was dramatized by the researcher who estimated there to be 65 million vacant homes across China using data on electricity usage (Powell, 2010) .
State Owned Enterprises in China's Real Estate Sector
The prosperity of housing market in China have attracted enterprises of various ownership forms to enter real estate development industry. Among them are State-Owned-Enterprise (SOEs), a legacy of China's former collective economy. Many SOEs that did not traditionally engage in the development of housing have established real estate development subsidiaries, buoyed in many cases by access to land and political connections. This expansion has occurred, in spite of the fact that scholars and the mass media have consistently argued that SOEs are inefficient and unprofitable (Schuman, 2012; Perkowski, 2013; Hsu, 2014) . Giovanni Ferri and Li-Gang Liu (2009) , for example, find that the existing profits of SOEs would completely disappear if they were to pay a market interest rate without benefiting from current credit subsidies from the government.
Multiple reasons for the inefficiency of SOEs in the different markets within which they operate have been proposed, including "overcapacity, inefficient cost control, slow industrial upgrading", "enormous expense budgets with inadequate performance" and "poor management of investment decisions" (Zhu, 2013; Cary, 2013) . There is also evidence of inefficiency among SOE real estate development companies, with some arguing it is because of their expansion into real estate without adequate expertise (Barboza, 2010 ). Chonglong Ren (2014 argues that compared with private real estate firms that maintain control of risks and do not over-leverage, SOE real estate developers usually have very high loan ratios, some reaching over 80 percent of their total capital. Under the liquidity adjustments imposed by the central government targeting housing development, some SOE developers have are forced to sell their assets to pay off loans.
Background and Data on Housing in Chengdu, Sichuan
Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province in Southwestern China, is an ideal instrumental case study. It exhibited an average house price appreciation and income growth from 2006 to 2010 among the 35 major cities in China, at about 10 percent for both (Wu et al., 2011) . Although Chengdu is not located on a completely featureless plain, other than some rivers its urban growth is relatively unhindered by natural geography. Thus, it takes a typical circular shape and, at least in the year 2000, exhibited a monocentric structure. This is demonstrated through the standard density gradient model 2 , which is estimated using township data from the year 2000 census. There are roughly 90 census areas within 20 kilometers of Chengdu's center. The gradient of -0.19 indicates that for each kilometer a neighborhood is located from the city center, its population density decreases by almost 20 percent. This was higher than that of Beijing, which was 12 percent during the same year (Zheng and Kahn, 2007) , although the average density of Chengdu, almost 16,000 people per square kilometer, was lower. Also similar to Beijing, more centrally located communities have a higher socioeconomic status. A regression of neighborhood education on distance yielded a negative coefficient, indicating that each kilometer further away from the center leads to a two percent drop in the percent of people with more than a high school education in that neighborhood. Distance explained more than 20 percent of neighborhood variation in this measure of education.
There are a multitude of challenges to measuring price change in China. Beyond the common problem of data availability and completeness, the housing market itself is quite new and perhaps most importantly, most property transactions are for new housing units, making the repeat sales method more challenging. A comparison of three price index methods by Wu and colleagues (2011) -the simple average method without quality adjustment, the matching approach with the repeat sales modeling framework, and the hedonic modeling approach -finds that the first two yield downward biased indexes and the hedonic approach is the most robust. Surprisingly, the simple average method yields more comparable results than the matching approach.
These indexes and other recent work on residential property markets in China Kahn 2008, Wu et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012) depend on transaction data obtained from the local government. For the present study, we use equivalent data for Chengdu from 2004-2011. There were roughly 600,000 residential transactions at almost 1,400 addresses 3 inside the six urban districts of Chengdu during this period, and about 100,000 sales in less than 100 addresses in the suburban and rural districts outside the urban core. All the transactions are for new properties. This is not a limiting factor for their representativeness of the property market in Chengdu, as any substantial resale market for housing in Chinese cities has not yet emerged.
The vast majority of sales in the dataset, roughly 90 percent, are pre-sales. The pre-sale strategy, in which units are sold before construction in order to obtain financing, is common in Asia (Wong et al., 2006) . Pre-sale units are sold at discount, although the discount in the Chengdu data is not too large. In projects at the median price, pre-sale units were four percent cheaper. There is, however, a strong positive relationship between the price of a unit and the pre-sale discount, so that more expensive properties were cheaper if purchased before construction.
<<Insert Table 1 about here>>   Table 1 reports a summary of the transaction data for the years 2004 to 2011 in Chengdu. The average real price per square meters has been consistently rising since 2004 and the price in 2011 is over two times higher than it was in 2004. Meanwhile, the average unit size declines and average floor of the transactions increases, indicating more high-rise residential complexes and an increasing residential density in Chengdu.
<<Insert Table 2 about here>> 3 Some of the addresses are single residential buildings whereas others are residential estates; collections of buildings developed by the same developer. Table 2 displays the distribution of the registration status of real estate developers in the sample. The National Bureau of Statistics of China has classified all business entities in China into three categories based on their funding source: domestic funded enterprises (CHOE), enterprises with funds from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMTOE) and enterprises with foreign investment (FOE). In Table 2 , we see that CHOE make up the largest share by far with SOEs accounting for a non-trivial portion of those companies. Enterprises with foreign investment or funds from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan occupy a much smaller percentage, around six percent. The dominance of domestic funded enterprises implies that the market for real estate development in Chengdu is still relatively closed to competition from developers outside mainland China. The share of total transactions by type of developer indicates that the real estate market in Chengdu is dominated by domestic funded developers and SOEs and foreign funded developers build slightly larger projects than standard domestic firms.
Analysis
Before modeling housing prices, we visualize the change in prices and characteristics of property In order to better understand the changes in housing stock in Chengdu during the boom years, and to test the hypothesis that different types of developers sell units at a different price ceteris paribus, we run a hedonic price model with per square meter sales price as the dependent variable. We pool data on all housing units transacted in Chengdu from 2004 to 2011 and incorporate year fixed effects. The model is as follows:
Ln (HPit)=βi+β1X1it+β2X2it+β3X3it+β4X4it+β5X5it+εit
Where HPit : Real sale price per square meter (yuan) for housing unit i in year t; X1it : A vector variable, unit level characteristics, including age of the unit, unit size, number of bedrooms and the floor the housing unit locates; X2it : Neighborhood level characteristics, including percentage of green area and size of the neighborhood; X3it : Accessibility to urban amenities, including the distance to urban center, major roads, minor roads, post office, police station, government office, primary school, college, university, transit stations and river. X4it : Geographic location, i.e. the quadrant in which the unit is located; X5it : Type of real estate developers, whether it is a SOE, FOE, HMTOE, or other domestically funded enterprise. Table 3 reports summary statistics by developer type. As Zheng and Kahn (2008) note, variables describing individual unit characteristics in this dataset are limited, only the size, floor number, and number of bedrooms. However, this is less of a concern in the contemporary Chinese context as all the units are in multi-unit buildings, which are quite similar in building structure and initial materials. The price impacts of differences in fit out are likely captured by the size of the project, as often larger developments have higher quality.
<<Insert Table 3 here>> In Table 3 , we see that housing units developed by SOEs generally sell at a lower price per square meter. This is surprising given that these units are newer, have more bedrooms and more green areas in the neighborhood than units sold by other types of developers. Moreover, compared with the average, units developed by SOEs are closer to the urban center and major roads; they also locate more proximately to transit, post offices, police station, government office, primary schools and university. Intuitively, all these factors except for distance to police station are positive amenities for property values, therefore a higher real housing price for units developed by SOE should be anticipated. Why the lower price then? It is possibly because they have some unobservable characteristics that reduce their value, such as poor property management, inadequate marketing efforts, negative firm reputations, or they simply are selling below market price.
<<Insert Table 4 here>> Table 4 reports the results of year fixed effects regressions, using the full sample from year 2004 to 2011. Column one displays the result of the null model without considering the type of developer. In columns two, three and four, we add the dummy variables for SOE, FOE and HMTOE, as well all three types respectively to examine the effects of developers' types on real housing sale price per square meter. We find that the dummy for SOE developers has a strongly significant negative relationship with housing prices. On average, a housing unit developed by SOE sells for seven percent less than an otherwise identical unit developed by non-SOE firms. On the contrary, housing developed by FOE and HMTOE are more expensive than housing units developed by other types of firms. Compared with non-SOE domestic funded real estate developers, developers with foreign funding and funding from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan sell their units at a nine and twenty percent premium respectively. There could be some unobserved housing characteristics that correlate with developers' types, such as the quality of property management and interior finishing. However, it is also likely that some of the price difference is related to the efficiency of different types of developers. Table 4 also reveals interesting information about the housing market in Chengdu, with variables describing individual units, local amenities, access to the transportation network, and local public goods. The age of a housing unit has significant and important negative impact on housing prices; with one year of age lowering prices by around six percent. Size also matters a great deal; a ten percent increase in area is associated with a thirteen percent higher price. However, it seems there is more demand for larger places with fewer bedrooms, as controlling for size, more bedrooms has a negative relationship with price.
In terms of local amenities, having more green space in the neighborhood has a positive impact on the sale price. As expected, given prior empirical work confirming monocentricity in Chinese cities (Zheng and Kahn, 2008) , the coefficient on distance to the city center is significant and negative. In Chengdu, apartments that are ten percent farther from the city center see a 12 percent drop in price. We use the number of minor roads within a radius of one kilometer of a housing unit as an indicator of urban density. Results in Table 4 indicate that higher density, i.e., more minor roads in the neighboring area, is associated with higher housing price.
When measuring accessibility to transportation networks, we find that the distance to major roads have the expected quadratic relationship to housing price. Housing units located very close to major roads sell at a discount, but as they move slightly further, the distance is positively related to price. This is expected because of the tradeoff between noise and pollution on the one hand, and better transportation accessibility on the other. We also measure the distance to transit stations, in this case bus stops, which is significantly, and negatively associated with housing prices reflecting the benefits of access.
Finally, we examine the role of local public goods in housing prices. Real housing prices decrease as the distance to primary school, college and university grows, although the underlying mechanism for these relationships is likely different. We hypothesize that being located near primary schools adds value for the convenience it implies for parents, whereas housing in neighborhood near universities is more valuable because of spillover effects of activities. Other public services have somewhat unexpected relationships to housing prices. The distance to police stations and post offices is slightly but significantly positively related to housing prices. This is possibly because these public services are more concentrated in older neighborhoods and associated with worse neighborhood environmental quality.
Conclusion
In this paper, we review recent literature on the Chinese housing market and characterize a series of regulations imposed by central and local governments over the past several decades. Then we analyze housing transaction data for the medium-sized city of Chengdu, China, from 2004 to 2011, matching it to a wide variety of other data including GIS data on local amenities and public services. This analysis uncovers several important and heretofore unrecognized facets of China's rapidly developing housing market. We show that there has been a standardization of housing sizes and total price, in spite of an increase in average price per square meter. We find that the monocentric model holds in Chengdu, and that most local amenities have the expected relationship to prices. Some public services, however, do not.
The principal contribution of the analysis is the evidence that SOE developers sell housing at a discount. Their sale performance is worse than the average domestic funded real estate developers, not to mention foreign-funded developers and developers with capital from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, which sell housing at a premium. This fact, combined with prior evidence that SOE developers tend to overbid during the land acquisition process , further bolsters the prevailing argument about the low efficiency of SOEs in China.
An important note in relation to the finding about SOE developers is its implication for housing affordability. Housing affordability in the large coastal Chinese cities has become a pressing problem during this period of housing boom (Chen et al., 2010) . Consistent with findings reported by Wu et al. (2012) , however, price-to-income ratios in Chengdu calculated based on averages do not reflect a growing affordability problem. The discount at which SOE developers sell housing benefits consumers and increases affordability. 
